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Introduction
The fi  nancial crisis and the resultant economic recession 
have seriously undermined the health of public fi  nances in 
almost all the developed economies. Budget defi  cits and 
public debt have risen sharply and it is clear that these 
budgetary problems will not disappear automatically once 
the economy has fully recovered from the recession. If 
policy remains unchanged, public debt will continue to 
increase in many countries. On top of this, the budgetary 
impact of the ageing of the population could drive up 
budget defi  cits and cause public debt to rise even more 
quickly.
Financial markets have reacted to the situation by casting 
doubt on the sustainability of some countries’ budgetary 
positions, which was expressed by a rise in the interest 
rates applying to those countries and even, as far as 
Greece is concerned, by problems in fi  nding sources of 
fi  nancing. Given these circumstances, the latter country 
was forced to appeal to its partners in the euro area and 
the IMF.
A clear and credible strategy for returning to a healthy 
and sustainable budgetary situation therefore seems to be 
absolutely essential for many economies. The Greek debt 
crisis and the threat that it might spread to other countries 
not only demonstrated the risks associated with budgets 
becoming derailed but also acted as a tipping point in the 
sense that, in its immediate aftermath, many countries   
drew up concrete consolidation plans.
The fi  rst chapter in this article outlines the current budg-
etary situation. This is followed by an explanation of why 
consolidation plans are urgently needed and an attempt is 
made to provide an answer to the question of what form 
those plans should preferably take. The last chapter con-
tains an insight into the strategies that have been drawn 
up to consolidate public fi  nances. This last chapter also 
looks back at the response of the European authorities to 
the Greek debt crisis and outlines the sometimes very con-
crete budgetary consolidation measures that a number of 
European countries have already taken. Lastly, a number 
of conclusions are drawn.
1.  Outline of budgetary positions
1.1  Current budgetary situation
The economic and fi  nancial crisis that began in the course 
of 2007 and worsened in 2008 had very signifi  cant con-
sequences for the public fi  nances of most of the advanced 
economies. On the one hand, many governments took 
action to rescue the fi  nancial system, and more specifi  cally 
the banks. On the other hand, they undertook extensive 
budgetary measures in order to limit the severity of the 
recession as far as possible, by way of their stimulus 
plans  (1). These complemented the automatic stabilisers so 
as to prevent the collapse of economic activity, but they 
*  The authors wish to thank Paul Butzen, Geert Langenus, Wim Melyn and 
Windy Vandevyvere for their contributions to this article.
(1) An article about these economic stimulus plans was published in the 
September 2009 edition of the Bank’s Economic Review.40
Chart 1  budgetary developMentS between 2007 
and 2010































































































































































FACTORS UNDERLYING THE DETERIORATION IN 
BUDGET BALANCES (1)








Sources : EC, IMF, OECD.
(1)  A positive (negative) sign indicates a deterioration (improvement) in the balance.
also adversely affected the budget situation in a great 
many countries.
Thus, the budget balance of most of the industrial coun-
tries has deteriorated sharply since 2007, from an aver-
age deficit of 1.7 p.c. of GDP to 8.9 p.c. in 2010, in the 
advanced countries of the G20. The deterioration was 
less severe in the emerging countries  : there, the budget 
surplus of 0.3 p.c. of GDP turned into a deficit of 3.7 p.c. 
of GDP.
The decline is pronounced in the United States and Japan, 
where the deficit is expected to amount to more than 
10 p.c. and about 8 p.c. of GDP respectively in 2010, and 
even more so in the United Kingdom, where it is likely to 
come out at 12 p.c. of GDP. In the euro area, very differ-
ent situations in the respective countries are sometimes 
concealed behind the expected deficit of 6.6 p.c. of 
GDP. Specifically, the budget deficit ranges from around 
12 p.c. and 10 p.c. of GDP in Ireland and Spain respec-
tively to some 5 to 6 p.c. in Germany, Belgium, Italy and 
the Netherlands and about 4 p.c. in Luxembourg, Finland 
and Malta. In China, as in many emerging countries, 
the budget balance has only deteriorated to a moderate 
degree.
However, the general deterioration cannot be attributed 
solely to the economic and financial crisis. In some coun-
tries, considerable deficits were already being recorded 
prior to the beginning of the crisis, whilst the favourable 
business cycle in 2007 put a gloss on the budget situation 
to some extent. In these countries, the crisis exerted a 
further adverse effect on what were already structurally 
weak budget positions in the first place.
Moreover, the weakening of budget positions since the 
beginning of the crisis is largely structural in nature. This 
deterioration is even chiefly structural in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Japan, whilst in the euro area as 
a whole, the automatic stabilisers played virtually as sig-
nificant a role as the structural factors. However, the latter 
were of critical importance in some countries in the euro 
area, such as Spain and Ireland, whilst in Italy, for exam-
ple, these factors only exerted a very limited influence.
The deterioration in the structural budget balance is partly 
explained by the stimulus packages which the various 
countries have put together for the years 2009-2010. 
According to the IMF, the discretionary measures are 
expected to amount to 3.9 p.c. of GDP on average in 
2009-2010 in the countries of the G20. They are likely to 
be more extensive in China, Japan and, to a lesser extent, 
the United States than in Europe. The stimulus plan coor-
dinated within the European Union has, according to the 41
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most recent EC data, a scope of 2.9 p.c. of GDP, whilst 
comparable measures achieve 4.7 p.c. of GDP in the 
United States and 5.8 p.c. of GDP in China.
The level of debt has grown drastically in many countries, 
primarily as a consequence of the deterioration in public 
finances in general. Thus, the government debt in the 
United States increased by about 28 percentage points 
of GDP between 2007 and 2010, to almost 90 p.c. of 
GDP. In Japan, where the level of debt was already par-
ticularly high in 2007, it is forecast to grow by a further 
32 percentage points of GDP, to almost 200 p.c. of GDP. 
The growth in the United Kingdom’s debt amounted to 
as much as 34 percentage points of GDP but due to the 
still relatively low level in 2007, the debt ratio is expected 
to remain more limited there, more specifically around 
80 p.c. of GDP in 2010. The rise was smaller in the euro 
area, albeit starting from a higher debt level in 2007, and 
so the public debt there is expected to come out at about 
85 p.c. of GDP at the end of 2010. The situation diverges 
relatively markedly in the countries making up the euro 
area. The strongest increase was posted in Ireland, at 
more than 50 percentage points of GDP, whilst the 
increases in Italy, Belgium and Germany remained limited 
to less than 15 percentage points of GDP. In China, the 
debt remained small and did not increase, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP – a finding which can be attributed to 
continuing strong growth figures.
The rescue operations in the financial sector only explain a 
small part of the overall rise in public debt since the begin-
ning of the crisis ; the most significant determinant of this 
rise is in any case the increase in budget deficits.
Given that the level of debt rose relatively markedly 
in those countries that had a relatively small debt in 
2007, the degrees of indebtedness tended to converge. 
However, Japan and China formed an exception to this 
trend, as did – to a lesser extent – Greece.
1.2  Prospects for public finances
The combination of extensive budget deficits and a high 
level of debt on the one hand, and the anticipated rise in 
government expenditure as a result of the ageing of the 
population on the other, casts doubt on the sustainability 
of public finances over the long term.
The ageing of the population will in any case weigh on 
public finances – and thus on debt – since it puts a brake 
on economic growth as a result of the fall in the popula-
tion of working age on the one hand, and since govern-
ment expenditure on pensions, health care and care of 
the elderly is increasing over the long term on the other. 
In the euro area, government expenditure associated with 
ageing is forecast to rise by 5.1 percentage points of GDP 
on an annual basis between 2010 and 2060.
On average across the euro area, the effort needed to 
meet the intertemporal budget constraint  (1) – the sustain-
ability gap – amounts to not less than 5.8 p.c. of GDP. 
The main determinants of the sustainability gap comprise 
the current structural budget position and the anticipated 
change in costs associated with ageing. However, the 
scope of the corrections required so as to achieve a sus-
tainable situation differs from one country to the next. 
Some countries, such as Greece, are having to contend 
with a large initial imbalance and considerable anticipated 
growth in age-related expenditure simultaneously. The 
sustainability of budget positions constitutes a severe 
problem outside the euro area too.
An alternative method of showing that current budg-
etary policy is unsustainable consists in simulating the 
increase in the debt if policy remains unchanged  (2). 
Chart 2  budget deficit and budgetary coStS of 
ageing






















































Sources : BIS, CBO, EC, IMF.
(1)  Costs that are limited to pensions, health care and long-term care.
(2)  With regard to Japan, the budgetary costs associated with ageing relate to the 
period 2010-2050.
(1) This constraint means that total expenditure over a long period is covered by total 
revenue over that same length of time.
(2) The EC’s simulations are carried out in the context of a partial equilibrium, where 
the reactions of the agents to such a level of debt are not taken into account. 
They do not involve realistic scenarios, therefore. The scenarios drawn up by the 
BIS do not seem to differ in this respect.42
Whilst the average level of debt in the euro area still 
amounted to 78.7 p.c. of GDP in 2009, this level would 
balloon to more than 400 p.c. of GDP by 2060. The 
other advanced   economies would not escape any more 
lightly : in the United Kingdom, the debt would climb to 
more than 750 p.c. in 2060, in Japan to about 350 p.c. 
by 2030 and in the United States to more than 200 p.c. 
by 2030.
2.  Budgetary consolidation is urgently 
needed
In most of the advanced economies, the present state of 
public finances is a cause for concern. A situation of this 
type implies very serious policy risks. It could bring about a 
sharp rise in interest and could have dire consequences for 
economic growth over the long term. This chapter looks 
at both these risks in detail.
2.1  Is there a danger of a sharp rise in interest ?
Growing government deficits and public debt have the 
effect of making interest rates move upwards. The IMF has 
carried out empirical research investigating what influence 
budgetary variables have on long-term interest rates (IMF, 
2009). This shows that a rise of 1 percentage point in the 
budget deficit leads to long-term interest rates on public 
securities being raised by 10 to 60 basis points. There is 
a relatively severe impact in countries with an unfavour-
able starting position with regard to public finances, weak 
institutions, a low savings rate and limited access to the 
international capital markets. The expectation that public 
finances will be more vulnerable as a result of the impact 
of population ageing also appears to reinforce the effect 
of government deficits on interest.
Up to now, however, long-term interest rates have 
remained relatively low in most countries. The upward 
pressure that emanated from growing government defi-
cits and public debt was counteracted by a number of 
factors which are also connected to the financial and 
economic crisis. Indeed, the crisis has caused an increase 
in the savings ratio of individuals, whilst private invest-
ment is running at a very low level. Moreover, the crisis 
has led to a sharp fall in inflation and expectations regard-
ing inflation which, together with real interest rates, are 
a component of nominal interest rates. Lastly, the very 
expansive monetary policy has also made a large contribu-
tion to the low interest rates. These factors are neverthe-
less temporary in nature and therefore do not constitute a 
lasting counterweight to the upward pressure on interest 
rates resulting from increasing government deficits and 
public debt.
Interest rates may rise if investors demand higher risk 
  premiums for their investments in public securities, 
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namely if the financial markets begin to make more 
allowance for a higher risk of default by some countries. 
Thus, in the first few months of 2010, the financial mar-
kets moved to a strong upward revision of the likelihood 
of Greece defaulting. The problems that Greece had to 
contend with also clearly show that financial markets can 
react suddenly and very strongly.
Furthermore, higher interest rates may be demanded 
when investors expect higher inflation. The inflation 
expectation may be fuelled in two ways. In the first 
place, the monetary and budgetary policy mix, which has 
become very expansive in virtually all countries in response 
to the financial and economic crisis, might be adjusted 
too late. Should this policy mix remain very expansive 
whilst economic activity picks up, this could then drive 
inflationary expectations upwards. Furthermore, investors 
could allow for a greater likelihood of monetisation of the 
public debt.
A situation in which investors and other economic actors 
proceed on the basis of higher inflationary expecta-
tions would not only lead to long-term interest rates 
being raised but would also have consequences for the 
conduct of monetary policy. In a situation of this type, 
a tightening of monetary policy in the form of higher 
short-term interest rates could appear unavoidable in any 
case. A timely budgetary exit, on the other hand, could 
dampen the increase in inflationary expectations, which 
would enable a more gradual tightening of monetary 
policy.
2.2  What is the impact of budget consolidation on 
economic growth ?
A lively debate is being conducted amongst economists 
about the impact of budgetary policy on growth. There 
is therefore a very extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on this topic. Although this does not provide 
an unequivocal answer, a number of cautious conclusions 
can nevertheless be drawn. In this respect, a distinction 
must be made between the impact over the short term 
and that over the long term.
Short-terM iMpact
It may be anticipated, a priori, that the measures that 
are being taken to consolidate the budget will have a 
negative effect on the economic cycle over the short term. 
After all, most empirical studies show that the budgetary 
multipliers – which indicate the extent to which a certain 
budgetary stimulus influences the growth in activity – are 
positive over the short term. However, the impact that 
budgetary adjustment has on economic growth varies 
according to the type of consolidation measure. Thus, it 
appears that public consumption and investment meas-
ures have a relatively marked impact on economic activity, 
whilst measures involving transfers, such as taxation and 
social benefit payments, have a smaller impact. The reason 
is that the latter only alter consumption and investment 
indirectly, by way of a change in the incomes of individu-
als and companies. The extent to which households and 
enterprises have to cope with restrictions on liquidity and 
credit is also an important aspect of the impact that rais-
ing taxation or lowering social benefit payments would 
have on economic growth.
Furthermore, it appears that the negative impact of 
consolidation measures on economic growth over the 
short term is smaller or even almost zero as the state of 
public finances becomes worse and is perceived as being 
a cause for concern. This has to do with the fact that 
consolidating measures may prevent the interest rate 
rising, which would depress private investment. Moreover, 
these measures may lead to a fall in the savings ratio, for 
instance because households start to do less in the way of 
precautionary savings as their confidence is restored fol-
lowing a period of budgetary problems. In this case, the 
influence on economic activity over the short term could 
remain very limited.
The latter elements are very relevant in the present situa-
tion ; so budget consolidation does not necessarily exert a 
strongly negative effect on the business cycle.
iMpact over the long terM
The long-term effects of a budget consolidation that 
guarantees the sustainability of public finances are unmis-
takably positive. These effects comprise amongst other 
things a fall in long-term interest rates due to a reduction 
in the quantity of public securities put into circulation. 
Furthermore, the fall in interest expenditure as a result 
of budgetary adjustment may release more funds for 
productive government expenditure or may limit the fiscal 
and parafiscal burden.
It appears from the economic literature that budget con-
solidation based on reducing expenditure is more success-
ful and has more favourable effects on economic growth 
over the long term than consolidation supported by rais-
ing government revenues. This applies in particular when 
the budget consolidation refers to expenditure other than 
what is often described as productive expenditure, such 
as expenditure on investment, education and research 
and innovation.44
Chart 4  Scope of the required budget conSolidation
(in p.c. of GDP)

















ACCORDING TO THE EC SUSTAINABILITY INDICATOR (S2) (1) ACCORDING TO A SIMULATION FROM THE BIS (2)
US
Sources : BIS, EC.
(1)  S2 indicates the permanent adjustment of the primary balance needed so as to comply with the intertemporal budget constraint indefinitely.
(2)  Difference between the primary balance anticipated for 2011 and the primary balance required within 20 years so as to stabilise the debt ratio at the level of 2007.
3.  How should budget consolidation 
proceed ?
This chapter looks at the question of how the restruc-
turing of public finances – a necessity in most of the 
advanced economies – needs to proceed. Firstly, an indi-
cation is given of the scope of the consolidation effort. 
Then, consideration is given to what the best timing is 
for starting to consolidate the budget. Lastly, a number of 
observations follow about the composition of the budget-
ary adjustment packages.
3.1  Scope of the necessary consolidation effort
The scope of the required budgetary consolidation can 
be measured on the basis of the difference between 
the present budgetary situation and a sustainable situa-
tion. One of the indicators of that difference – referred 
to as “S2” by the EC – specifies the effort that needs 
to be delivered with regard to the primary balance so 
as to comply with the budget constraint indefinitely, 
whilst taking into account the extra expenditure associ-
ated with the ageing of the population. The EC (2009a)   
regularly performs this exercise for all the European   
countries. The BIS  (1) has also carried out a simulation   
which can be used as a basis for measuring the required 
budgetary effort.
The effort to be made needs to refer to two elements  : 
a lowering of the initial structural budget deficit and the 
cost of ageing. It appears from these indicators that all 
the countries under consideration need to deliver a sub-
stantial effort with regard to sustainability. According to 
the EC, the effort in the euro area amounts to 5.8 p.c. of 
GDP on average ; here, the burden of ageing constitutes a 
greater problem with regard to sustainability than the ini-
tial budgetary position, amounting to 3.5 p.c. and 2.3 p.c. 
of GDP respectively. According to the exercise undertaken 
by the BIS, which differs to some extent and does not 
include all the European countries, Japan and the United 
States would generally have to deliver greater efforts than 
the countries in the euro area.
According to the S2 indicator, the effort needed to return 
to a sustainable budgetary position is particularly marked 
in Greece, where a consolidation of more than 20 per-
centage points of GDP is required. Spain, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom also need to make a considerable 
effort – that is, more than 13 percentage points of GDP. 
Although Italy, for instance, seems to be less far removed 
from a sustainable budgetary situation, that country 
needs to reduce its public debt – the second highest in 
(1) Cecchetti et al. (2010). In this simulation, the authors studied the primary 
balance anticipated for 2011 and the primary balance that needs to be attained 
within 5, 10 and 20 years so as to stabilise the debt ratio at the level of 2007. 
The difference between the two balances indicates the effort to be made.45
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Chart 5  total governMent expenditure before 
and after the econoMic criSiS











































the European Union – just as much in order to ward off 
other risks, such as the impact of a renewed interest rate 
rise on the budget situation.
3.2  Timing of budget consolidation
Given that the economic recovery is still fragile at the 
moment, substantial and rapid consolidation efforts deliv-
ered by most countries simultaneously – on top of the 
ending of the stimulus measures – could entail risks for 
the economic revival. A postponement of consolidation 
efforts, on the other hand, could lead to financing risks 
and rising long-term interest rates.
In view of these risks, there is an urgent need for cred-
ible consolidation programmes. These must be aimed at 
a substantial narrowing of what is in many countries the 
very wide sustainability gap, which reflects the difference 
between the current primary balance and the balance 
needed to guarantee the sustainability of public finances. 
A distinction can be drawn in this regard between the 
announcement of consolidation plans and their imple-
mentation. To prevent doubt arising about the sustain-
ability of public finances, it is advisable not to delay the 
announcement of concrete and credible plans, even if 
they are to be largely put into effect during the years to 
come. In view of the scope of the consolidation effort 
required in most countries, spreading it out over a period 
of time seems in fact to be unavoidable.
The timing of budget consolidation may be different 
depending on the economic circumstances in the specific 
countries. Amongst other things, allowance needs to be 
made in this regard for the economic cycle and the budg-
etary situation. In countries where public finances have 
been seriously derailed and are regarded as problematical, 
and where the confidence of the financial markets in sus-
tainability is damaged or threatens to be damaged, public 
finances have to be consolidated urgently anyway.
3.3  What should the budgetary adjustment plans 
look like ?
Fundamental consolidation measures are therefore 
required in most of the advanced countries. These con-
solidation measures have to be aimed to a large extent at 
the expenditure side. As already mentioned, measures that 
focus on limiting non-productive government expenditure 
do in any case have a much more positive effect on eco-
nomic growth over the long term than raising revenues. 
Moreover, the financial and economic crisis has caused 
the expenditure ratio to rise sharply in virtually all countries 
concerned. In the euro area and the United Kingdom, the 
ratio has risen from about 45 p.c. of GDP in 2007 to more 
than 50 p.c. of GDP in 2009. In Japan too, the expendi-
ture ratio has grown by almost 7 percentage points over 
the period, to 42 p.c. in 2009. In the United States, the 
rise remained limited to 3.1 percentage points, with the 
result that the expenditure ratio increased to about 40 p.c. 
Together with France and Finland, Belgium belongs to a 
group of countries where the expenditure ratio has grown 
to as much as approximately 55 p.c. of GDP.
Combined with the budgetary costs of ageing, which are 
very considerable in some countries, and the expectation 
that interest charges will also rise, such high expenditure 
ratios can barely be financed by way of government 
revenues, if at all. This would in any case demand very 
severe fiscal and parafiscal pressure, which would have 
a negative impact on economic growth. More selective 
government action is therefore evidently required in 
most countries. In the face of the unavoidable savings 
in government expenditure, gains in efficiency have to 
be pursued anyway. The consolidation also needs to 
be aimed especially at expenditure that is regarded as 
non-productive. Productive government expenditure, on 
the other hand, including that for education, for certain 
investments and for R&D, preferably needs to be spared 
as far as possible since it is a significant stimulus for eco-
nomic growth over the long term.46
However, due to the scope of the consolidation effort 
to be made, raising government revenues also seems 
to be unavoidable. In some countries with a relatively 
low burden of taxation, there is a useful margin for this. 
However, the weight of taxation – particularly on earned 
income – is already very heavy in a great many countries, 
for example in Belgium. In these countries, the margins 
for raising revenues and thereby consolidating the budget 
tend to be limited. Nevertheless, these countries also have 
a number of options at their disposal. Thus, it is possible 
to point to the discussions that are currently being held at 
international meetings about the introduction of a specific 
tax on financial institutions, which is regarded by some as 
compensation for the systemic risk that these institutions 
embody. In addition to this, there are also ample margins 
with regard to environmental levies or, as a technical vari-
ant of these, the sale of emission rights. Using the tool of 
environmental levies on a greater scale means that both 
environmental and budgetary objectives could be pur-
sued. Lastly, more efficient collection of taxes must be an 
aim and a broadening of the tax base can be considered.
The budgetary adjustment plans preferably also need to 
include measures that are aimed at limiting the budgetary 
costs associated with ageing, and certainly in countries 
which have not yet put enough reforms into effect in this 
regard. If policy remains unchanged, substantial rises are 
in prospect in many countries for expenditure on health 
care and pensions especially. Measures that hold down 
the budgetary costs of ageing may in fact be of crucial 
importance in some countries, so as to remove doubts 
about the sustainability of public finances. Moreover, 
measures that result in pushing up the effective pension 
age, or other measures with an effect over the long term, 
do not have a direct negative impact on economic recov-
ery, which is very important in the current circumstances.
4.  Budgetary consolidation plans 
in the United States, Japan and 
the European Union
In the last few years, the G20 has played a significant 
coordinating role in combating the financial and eco-
nomic crisis. As far as budgetary policy is concerned, it 
was agreed that measures should be taken in support 
of domestic demand but without losing sight of the sus-
tainability of public finances. At the summit meeting in 
Pittsburgh in September 2009, emphasis was placed on 
the need for cooperation and coordination when, at the 
appropriate time, the extraordinary policy support would 
be withdrawn. The call therefore went out at that summit 
of the G20 leaders, and also during subsequent meet-
ings, to develop credible budgetary exit strategies now, 
whilst making allowance for the differences between 
countries and any possible spillover effects. The Toronto 
summit in June 2010 again underlined the need to draw 
up credible, well-phased and growth-friendly plans, albeit 
differentiated and tailored to national circumstances, for 
the purpose of guaranteeing the sustainability of public 
finances. In this respect, countries with serious budgetary 
problems need to consolidate their budgets more rapidly. 
The world leaders emphasised the fact that healthy public 
finances are essential for the economic revival, provide 
flexibility so as to respond to new shocks, safeguard the 
capacity to face up to the challenges of population ageing 
and prevent government deficits and public debt being 
passed on to future generations. However, the consolida-
tion process has to be carefully calibrated so as to support 
the revival in private demand. The risks that synchronised 
budget austerity across various major economies may have 
an unfavourable impact on the economic revival, on the 
one hand, and that the failure to carry out consolidation 
plans where they are needed would undermine confidence 
and would hinder growth, on the other hand, have to be 
carefully weighed up. As a reflection of this balance, the 
advanced countries have committed themselves to at least 
the halving of government deficits by 2013 and the sta-
bilisation of public debt as a percentage of GDP by 2016.
4.1  United States
After considerable amounts had already been allocated to 
stimulate the economy during the years 2008 and 2009, 
budgetary stimulus was raised further in 2010. However, 
measures of this type have met with more and more 
resistance given that the pressure to prepare a budgetary 
exit has increased. In mid 2010, the Congress had only 
approved very few concrete measures in this regard, but 
the President has already formulated a number of propos-
als which give an indication of the path intended to be 
followed.
At the beginning of February 2010, the Obama admin-
istration announced a path for public finances over the 
medium term (up to 2020), together with the federal 
budget for the fiscal year 2011. At the end of June, 
this path was updated in the mid-session review of the 
budget. The federal government deficit is projected to 
fall to 9.2 p.c. of GDP in the fiscal year 2011, as against 
10 p.c. of GDP in 2010. It appears from the budget path 
for the next ten years that the government subsequently 
wishes to drive down the deficit to 3.4 p.c. of GDP in 
2018. Thereafter, the deficit is projected to rise again to 
3.8 p.c. in 2020 due to the influence of increasing costs 
associated with population ageing. The prospective fall in 
the deficit would primarily be the result of the expiry of 47
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the support measures that the government took in the 
context of the crisis and the anticipated economic revival. 
The deficit will also diminish due to a number of new 
measures, the most significant of these being the freez-
ing of discretionary expenditure not relating to national 
security for a period of three years  ; streamlining existing 
expenditure programmes  ; scrapping the tax reduction for 
the highest income brackets  ; stopping subsidies to major 
energy companies and the introduction of a levy on large 
financial institutions. According to the budget proposals, 
the federal public debt is forecast to increase from 53 p.c. 
of GDP in the fiscal year 2009 to 77.4 p.c. in 2020. The 
OECD predicts that total public debt will grow from 
83 p.c. of GDP in 2009 to 94.8 p.c. in 2011.
Moreover, so as to give form to the budgetary policy, a 
two-party committee was set up (National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform) which must draw up 
concrete proposals for even more fundamental consolida-
tion by the beginning of December. The most important 
objectives of this committee, to be achieved over the 
medium term, by 2015, are to bring the primary balance 
into equilibrium and to propose extra measures to guaran-
tee the sustainability of public finances over the long term.
In addition, the so-called PAYGO rule is being re-intro-
duced. This rule requires that new expenditure pro-
grammes or tax cuts must be paid for by means of savings 
or tax rises on other items. This rule will provide additional 
support for the required budgetary effort.
4.2  Japan
The new Prime Minister is setting the restoration of 
public finances high on the agenda. On 22 June 2010, 
he announced the broad outlines of his budgetary 
restructuring plan. The plan contains ambitious objec-
tives, amongst other things to post a primary surplus by 
the fiscal year 2020 (following a halving of the primary 
deficit by 2015). The reforms necessary to achieve these 
objectives are currently being worked out in detail. The 
tax system would be thoroughly revised ; and government 
expenditure and the issuing of government bonds would 
be limited for the fiscal years 2011 to 2013.
4.3  European Union
4.3.1    European authorities’ decisions and the stability 
programmes
In spite of the risks to the sustainability of public finances, 
the EC came out in favour of a recovery plan for the 
European economy at the end of 2008. A European 
Economic Recovery Plan was approved at the European 
Council meeting on 11 and 12 December 2008. This 
urged an immediate and coordinated budget stimulus, 
and preference was given to action which would help 
meet the Lisbon targets.
Subsequently, various European authorities fairly quickly 
advocated budget strategies involving scaling back the 
support measures for the economy. Thus, the Ecofin 
Council established formally in October 2009 that the 
time was right to prepare and map out an exit strategy 
from the support policy, even though the recovery was still 
fragile and the assistance measures still had to remain in 
place. On top of the scrapping of stimulus measures, the 
Council recommended extensive budgetary consolidation. 
Within the context of the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
coordinated strategy needed to make allowance for the 
specific situation of each country, and to be implemented 
with effect from 2011 at the latest, and in some countries 
even sooner. The consolidation plans had to be ambi-
tious and come out substantially above the consolidation 
benchmark of an annual 0.5 percentage points of GDP in 
structural terms that is included in the pact. Lastly, the exit 
strategy should be accompanied by other measures, for 
example a stronger budgetary framework – which con-
tributes to the credibility of the consolidation –, as well as 
by measures to promote sustainability over the long term 
and by structural reforms to improve productivity and to 
stimulate investment over the long term.
In November 2009, the Ecofin Council also emphasised 
the fact that the deterioration in the budgetary position 
made the problems resulting from ageing more compli-
cated. At the time, the Council requested the Member 
States to concentrate their attention on strategies that 
were aimed at safeguarding the sustainability of their 
public finances, amongst other things in their stability and 
convergence programmes.
At the same time as this gradual change of course by 
the Ecofin Council and the EC, the Governing Council of 
the ECB also repeatedly emphasised that it is important 
to pursue the sustainability of public finances in order to 
maintain confidence and promote economic recovery. The 
announcement and, subsequently, the implementation of 
ambitious exit strategies had to contribute to the realisa-
tion of these objectives.
Each time a country’s budget deficit exceeds the thresh-
old of 3 p.c. of GDP, the EC investigates whether this 
overshoot is merely exceptional and temporary, and 
whether the deficit remains in the vicinity of the thresh-
old. “Exceptional” means that the overshoot is either 48
Chart 6  evolution of governMent deficitS 
according to the Stability prograMMeS 
(or convergence prograMMeS)  (1)






























































Sources : EC, national stability or convergence programmes.
(1)  Since the introduction of these programmes, some countries have updated their 
objectives.
Table 1 Decisions taken by the ecofin council to 
iDentify a situation of excessive Deficit  
for some countries
 
Deficit in 2009  (1) 
(in p.c. of GDP)
 
Time-limit  
currently identified  
for correction of  
the excessive deficit
 
Germany  .............. –3.3 2013
France  ................ –7.5 2013
Italy  .................. –5.3 2012
Spain  ................. –11.2 2013
Netherlands   ............ –5.3 2013
Belgium  ............... –6.0 2012
Austria  ................ –3.4 2013
Greece  ................ –13.6 2014  (2)
Finland  ................ –2.2 2011
Ireland  ................ –14.3 2014
Portugal  ............... –9.4 2013
Slovakia  ............... –6.8 2013
Slovenia  ............... –5.5 2013
Cyprus  ................ –6.1 2012
Malta  ................. –3.8 2011
Source : EC.
(1)  Notification dated March 2010.
(2)  Insufficient action and subsequent step in the procedure (public notification).
 
the result of an event that the Member State has no 
control over or a serious recession. Following this analysis, 
the Ecofin Council decides whether or not a deficit is 
excessive.
At the present time, fifteen of the sixteen Member States 
of the euro area are regarded as countries with an exces-
sive deficit, since their deficits are neither limited nor 
temporary. Within the euro area, only Luxembourg has 
a deficit that has not yet been declared to be excessive.
Moreover, whenever an excessive deficit is recorded, the 
Council imposes a deadline for eliminating that deficit. As 
a rule, this coincides with the year following the identifi-
cation of an excessive deficit, but sometimes exceptional 
circumstances may cause that deadline to be extended. 
Thus, the deadline has been extended one or more times 
for all the affected countries except Finland since, on the 
one hand, the Commission made allowance for the reper-
cussions of the economic and financial crisis and judged 
that it was necessary to prevent a budgetary consolidation 
prolonging the recession and, on the other hand, correc-
tive measures were taken in a number of countries which 
were followed by a significant and unexpected adverse 
economic event.
The deadline currently imposed for correcting excessive 
deficits is 2011 for Malta and Finland, 2012 for Cyprus, 
Belgium and Italy and 2013 for the other countries, with 
the exception of Ireland and Greece which are being given 
until 2014. In February of this year, Greece had been 
given a first deferral until 2012 ; that deferment was then 
extended on 7 May to the year 2014. This relaxation has 
to do with the fact that economic activity is expected to 
continue to contract into 2011, that the deficit for 2009 
turned out larger than initially estimated and that the 
risk premiums which Greece now has to pay have risen 
sharply.
As a result of these decisions, the European countries 
submitted updates to their stability programmes (or to 
their convergence programmes for those countries that 
do not participate in monetary union) at the beginning 
of 2010. According to these updates, the Member States 
are expected to drive their deficits down to the threshold 49
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of 3 p.c. of GDP or slightly below by 2013 at the latest. 
The only exceptions are Greece, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, for which the deadline for eliminating an 
excessive government deficit falls after 2013, whilst the 
Netherlands would have to accomplish this by 2013 but 
has submitted a programme limited to 2012.
Most of the countries with an extensive budget deficit 
want to reduce it with effect from 2010. France is the 
only one among those where the deficit is projected 
to continue to rise. The Netherlands, Germany, Finland 
and Luxembourg – which had to contend with smaller 
budget deficits in 2009 – are expected to allow their 
deficits to grow somewhat further in 2010. As for the 
European Union as a whole, the deficit is projected to 
continue to increase initially, to 7.2 p.c. of GDP in 2010. 
At the aggregate level, the consolidation is therefore only 
likely to become visible in 2011, when only Luxembourg 
is expected to still post a deterioration in its balance, 
according to its stability programme. According to the 
stability or convergence programmes, the average general 
government balance of the countries in the European 
Union would fall back to the threshold of 3 p.c. of GDP 
in 2013. However, there is sometimes a great disparity 
between the intentions of the Member States to drive 
down their deficit and the measures required to achieve 
these objectives actually being put into effect. Thus, for 
most countries, the budgetary targets identified in the 
stability programmes cannot be met without new meas-
ures, according to the spring forecasts of the EC published 
on 5 May 2010. With regard to the European Union, the 
budgetary consolidation effort which still had to be deliv-
ered for 2011 amounted to an average of 0.9 percent-
age points of GDP. Given that some countries have since 
decided to take new consolidation measures, the total 
effort still to be made has, logically, diminished.
In many countries, the scope of the required consolida-
tion implies that measures should be put into effect on 
the revenue and the expenditure sides simultaneously. In 
countries that already have a high ratio of government 
revenues, a consolidation effected by raising those rev-
enues would normally be smaller than in countries with 
a lower ratio. Of those countries where the revenue ratio 
was already higher than 45 p.c. of GDP in 2009, only 
Belgium and France are therefore planning to boost that 
ratio further by 2012-2013. On the other hand, raising 
revenues is likely to contribute to the consolidation in a 
large number of countries of the European Union with 
a government expenditure ratio of less than 45 p.c. of 
GDP except, specifically, in Germany. With regard to 
the European Union as a whole, therefore, this ratio is 
expected to rise slightly, that is to say from 43 p.c. of GDP 
in 2009 to 43.3 p.c. in 2012.
Lowering the expenditure ratio, on the other hand, is 
a virtually universal intention which differs, however, 
in terms of scope. Only the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus and Malta wish to raise this ratio between 2009 
and 2012-2013. At the other end of the spectrum, this 
lowering is projected to amount to not less than 4.8 per-
centage points of GDP in Spain. Viewed as an average 
across the European Union, the expenditure ratio is fore-
cast to fall back by 2.1 percentage points of GDP between 
2009 and 2012.
4.3.2  Greek debt crisis and policy responses
Greece has already been in a delicate budgetary position 
for some time. The Greek public debt is the largest – in 
proportional terms – of the countries in the euro area.   
The financial and economic crisis has caused its gov-
ernment deficit and public debt to grow significantly. 
Moreover, if policy remains unchanged, Greece would 
have to cope with a steep increase in the expenditure 
associated with population ageing over the long term, 
with the result that the sustainability of public finances 
may be regarded as a cause for concern.
Chart 7  planned changeS with regard to 
governMent expenditure and incoMe 
(in percentage points of GDP, between 2009 and 2012-2013)



















Sources : EC, national stability and convergence programmes.
(1)  With regard to Greece, this relates to the obligations arising from the agreements 
of 2 May 2010.
(2)  With regard to Italy, part of the effort to reach the targeted balance has not yet 
been distributed between revenue and expenditure in its stability programme. The 
effort still to be distributed amounts to 0.4 p.c. of GDP in 2011 and 1.2 p.c. of 
GDP in 2012.50
In October 2009, the sharp upward revision of the 
government deficit in Greece produced tension on the 
securities market for the Greek public debt. In April 2010, 
anxiety about the sustainability of Greek public finances 
increased, with the result that the interest rates at which 
the Greek State could obtain financing rose sharply, 
thereby causing a liquidity crisis. Moreover, contagion 
effects emerged. Operators on the financial markets 
focussed their attention on the situation of countries with 
similar, albeit far less acute, problems in the area of public 
finances and competitiveness, for example Portugal and 
Spain. In addition, the fear that Greece’s insolvency, and 
possibly that of other countries, would bring about losses 
that would destabilise the financial sector drove up the 
banks’ financing charges. Lastly, the potential influence 
of this anxiety on the financing of the economy prompted 
falls on share markets, a rise in the risk premiums associ-
ated with corporate bonds and a depreciation of the euro.
The international authorities have taken various measures 
to prevent the crisis spreading and to guarantee financial 
stability in the euro area. They would thereby provide 
financial assistance to countries which have to contend 
with a self-fulfilling lack of trust on the financial markets, 
in order to give them time to win back their credibility, 
and they would also restore the operation of distorted 
markets and guarantee that the public finances of coun-
tries in difficulties would be thoroughly consolidated.
In the first place, the European budgetary authorities 
and the IMF have set up a system of conditional financial 
assistance. On 11 April 2010, following a previous agree-
ment in principle by the heads of state and government 
leaders of the euro area countries on 25 March 2010, the 
Eurogroup reached an accord on the concrete methods 
for providing emergency financing to Greece. This emer-
gency financing was to take the form of bilateral loans 
by the various other countries in the euro area and the 
IMF. In the first phase, an overall amount of € 30 billion 
in bilateral loans was under consideration. However, fol-
lowing the official request from the Greek government to 
activate the support package, the accord was specified in 
greater detail and substantially expanded on 2 May 2010 : 
in the context of a three-year programme, Greece will be 
able to borrow €  110 billion, consisting of €  30 billion 
from the IMF and €  80 billion from the other Member 
States in the euro area. The loans are subject to the 
condition that Greece takes vigorous measures to consoli-
date its budget (see below). The accord also provides for 
the implementation of structural reforms to strengthen 
the Greek economy, amongst other things by way of 
smoother operation of the labour market.
Since this decision only brought a very temporary calm 
to the financial markets, a decision was taken at the 
Ecofin Council meeting on 9-10 May 2010 to set up 
a European Stabilisation Mechanism for a period of   
three years, in order to provide conditional financial 
assistance to countries which find themselves in financ-
ing difficulties as a result of exceptional events that 
are beyond their control, and to do so for a total of 
€ 500 billion. A sum of € 60 billion, which is intended 
for all EU Member States, could be financed by loans 
from the EC. Moreover, a Special Purpose Vehicle   
guaranteed by the Member States of the euro area 
could contribute up to €  440 billion to the financing 
of assistance for countries in the euro area. The IMF 
would take part in the support operations and would 
help to work out the granting conditions. At the same 
meeting, the Council stated expressly that plans for 
budgetary consolidation and structural reforms will be 
accelerated, where warranted. In this connection, the 
governments of Spain and Portugal announced new 
budgetary measures.
Once the ECB’s Governing Council had adapted the 
rules regarding guarantees for loans by the Eurosystem, 
it approved a series of measures on 10 May 2010 to 
calm the severe tensions on certain markets. Specifically, 
the ECB decided to undertake interventions on the 
markets for government and corporate bonds in the 
euro area, in order to remove the dysfunctional aspects 
of those markets. It also began once again to provide 
three-month and six-month funds at a fixed interest 
rate and for an unlimited amount, as well as funds in 
US   dollars. In the euro area, the aim of monetary policy 
is still price stability : decisions about the course of mon-
etary policy will be taken on the basis of an evaluation 
of both the risk of inflation (amongst other things, it 
is necessary to prevent an incorrect perception of the 
monetary financing of the public sector giving birth to 
inflationary expectations) and also the risk of deflation 
(with regard to which proper allowance is being made 
for the effect of budgetary consolidation on demand 
and therefore on prices).
Lastly, the intention is to learn the necessary lessons   
from the crisis in order to improve management of   
the euro area, especially with reference to budget-
ary policy and monitoring. The EC announced a series 
of proposals on 12 May 2010. In the meantime, a 
Working Group on Economic Governance, set up by   
the European Council, has also begun its work. This 
group has to submit its conclusions to the European 
Council in October 2010.51
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Box –   Proposals of the Working Group on Economic Governance set up 
by the European Council
Based on the finding that the current crisis is partly the result of a lack of respect for the rules applicable within 
the European Union and of the loopholes in economic policy coordination, the EC has addressed a series of 
proposals to the European institutions so as to strengthen the coordination between those institutions. Thus, the 
EC considers it necessary, in a statement dated 12 May 2010, to introduce measures to strengthen the operation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, to expand the monitoring to macroeconomic imbalances, to set up a “European 
Semester” that offers an opportunity to coordinate economic policy at the European level at an early stage, and 
to put into effect the European Stabilisation Mechanism approved by the Council on 9 May.
On the basis of these same considerations, the European Council meeting in March 2010 set up a working group 
to look at economic governance. This group, under the leadership of the President of the European Council, 
consists of representatives of all the Member States of the EU – mainly the Ministers of Finance –, a member of 
the EC, the President of the ECB and the President of the Eurogroup. This working group, which has partly taken 
its lead from the EC’s proposals, is seeking to achieve four major objectives  : it wishes to strengthen budgetary 
discipline by making the Stability and Growth Pact more efficient, find methods to reduce the differences in 
competitiveness between the countries, work out a mechanism to resolve financial crises and improve economic 
management. An interim report was submitted to the European Council on 17 June, which approved part of the 
proposed initial guidelines.
Thus – with regard to public finances – coordination would have to take place ex ante and the national budgeting 
procedures would have to include the stability or convergence programmes. In this connection, a “European 
Semester” will be introduced as from 2011, running from the spring to the presentation of the budgets in the 
national parliaments. The draft national budgets would be submitted to the EC and the other Member States of 
the EU, which would then provide their comments on the most significant assumptions adopted for compiling 
these budgets and on the main budgetary aggregates. This timescale would offer an opportunity to make changes 
at the national level prior to presentation to the respective national parliaments.
In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact would have to be toughened up, which implies a change of course 
compared to its relaxation in 2005. The tightening of the rules would have to relate both to the preventive 
and the corrective components of the pact. Sanctions would have to be coherent and would have to follow a 
progressive system. Amongst other things, the working group has put forward the possibility of implementing 
sanctions even if the government deficit does not exceed the threshold of 3 p.c. of GDP, for example if there is 
no response following warnings or if the level of debt rises alarmingly. However, the Council has not yet approved 
these elements. The EC too, which had already proposed a more automatic application of the rules and more 
rapid sanctions, still has to submit proposals. It has also already raised the possibility of new sanctions, for instance 
suspending the payment of some support amounts or grants, or withdrawing certain voting rights.
Moreover, the debt and – more generally – the sustainability of public finances would gain greater importance in 
the budgetary monitoring practised. This should prompt the Member States to take up a budgetary position that 
makes better allowance for the ageing of the population and, even in a favourable economic climate, to seek to 
meet consolidation targets over the medium term. Specifically, the working group is thinking about the possibility 
of initiating the procedure for excessive deficits more rapidly for countries where the debt does not come down 
sufficiently rapidly.
Following this same line of reasoning, the European Council believes it necessary to ensure that the Member States 
draw up appropriate budgeting rules at the national level and define a budgetary framework over the medium 
term which is in accord with the Stability and Growth Pact. These rules and this budgetary framework would be 
submitted to the EC and the Council for approval.52
Furthermore, the European Council states that it is essential to have reliable and independently collated statistics 
available, which implies that the national statistical institutions must not be subject to any political influence 
whatsoever. In this connection, the EC is proposing to expand the checks that Eurostat can carry out.
Apart from these aspects, which in strict terms are associated with budgetary discipline, the Council has also 
already approved certain lines of thinking which the working group has launched with regard to macroeconomic 
monitoring. This is primarily a matter of creating a scoreboard with which distortions of balance can be detected, 
as well as any possible loss of competitiveness or sharp rises in the prices of assets. The working group is proposing 
that, if there is an alert, recommendations could be formulated in the areas of budgetary income and expenditure, 
the operation of the markets and macroprudential measures.
Lastly, the working group is also examining the setting up of a permanent crisis management system, which is 
thought to be very much needed in the euro area. This system would offer an opportunity to provide financial 
assistance to those Member States in need of help, but then under strict conditions so as to avoid problems of 
moral hazard which would prompt the states to behave irresponsibly.
The final report of the Working Group on Economic Governance should be presented at the European Council 
meeting in October 2010.
4.3.3  Consolidation plans and measures in Europe
It was explained above how a coordinated budgetary exit 
strategy was worked out for the countries in the European 
Union, in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Some countries have already taken steps fairly rapidly for 
the purpose of guaranteeing sustainable public finances. 
Thus, Germany incorporated a so-called “debt brake” in 
its constitution in mid 2009. This “brake” is regarded as 
an institutional guarantee of budgetary consolidation. 
Initially, the adoption of specific measures to flesh out 
the budgetary exit strategy was still mainly limited to the 
year 2010 in most countries, whilst only a little in the way 
of concrete action was planned for the subsequent years. 
However, this all moved into a higher gear as a result of 
the Greek debt crisis.
Greece needed to take very far-reaching consolidation 
measures and put profound structural reforms into effect 
if it wished to be able to lay claim to international emer-
gency financing. Spain and Portugal for their part, as a 
reaction to the Ecofin Council agreement on 9 May 2010 
to accelerate the plans for budgetary consolidation and 
structural reforms where warranted, tightened up their 
budgetary objectives for 2010 and 2011 and announced 
significant supplementary measures. Shortly thereafter, 
many other countries accelerated their decision-making 
and published extensive austerity plans.
The following provides an overview of the most significant 
recent measures in a number of countries.
greece
Greece’s adjustment plan implies an effort that has to 
result in an improvement of at least 10 p.c. of GDP in 
the structural balance and which is aimed at reducing the 
budget deficit to 2.6 p.c. of GDP by 2014. The scope of 
the actual consolidation effort is preferably estimated on 
the basis of the progress of the structural primary balance. 
Given that it may reasonably be assumed that interest 
charges will rise, these objectives embody a budgetary 
effort which is estimated at 13 p.c. of GDP, and is on top 
of the significant measures already taken by the Greek 
government in 2010.
The specific consolidation measures that the Greek gov-
ernment has to take in order to drive down the budget 
deficit are already described to a large extent in the 
conditions for the emergency financing. On the revenue 
side, they involve, amongst other things, the introduc-
tion of a uniform, progressive system of taxation for all 
incomes, including the abrogation of all tax exemptions 
and separate taxation arrangements. Another item being 
introduced is stricter taxation of certain professional cat-
egories where tax fraud is thought to be rife. A raising of 
value added tax is also provided for  : after the standard 
rate of VAT had already been pushed up from 19 p.c. 
to 21 p.c. on 15 March 2010, it is to be raised again to 53
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23 p.c., and in addition the tax base is to be expanded 
by, amongst other things, taxing certain services that are 
exempt at present and moving other goods and services 
from a reduced rate to the standard rate. Furthermore, 
it has been decided to raise the excise duties on fuel, 
tobacco and alcohol and to levy a temporary “crisis tax” 
on particularly profitable enterprises during the period 
from 2011 to 2013 ; the gradual introduction of a new tax 
on CO2 emissions is also planned.
On the expenditure side, drastic cuts have to be made 
in pensions and civil servants’ pay. Thus, the monthly 
amounts of the highest pensions are being lowered. In 
addition, various bonuses and allowances paid to pen-
sioners and civil servants are being scrapped or reduced. 
Finally, substantial cost savings are also planned for inter-
mediate consumption and investment. All in all, these 
involve draconian measures. However, social aspects are 
being incorporated to a limited extent  ; thus, minimum 
pensions are being guaranteed.
The structural reforms affect various areas of activity. 
Thus, Greece needs to take effective measures so as to 
strengthen budgetary follow-up and the reliability of 
macro  economic statistics, and especially the statistical data 
with regard to public finances. Furthermore, certain labour 
market reforms are being imposed, both in the public and 
the private sector. Lastly, the sustainability of the pension 
system over the medium and long term must be improved, 
by way of various clearly delineated actions, by September 
2010 at the latest. Amongst other things, these involve the 
introduction of a uniform statutory pension age of 65, a 
gradual increase in the number of working years required 
for a full pension, the introduction of a minimum age for 
taking retirement (60 years of age), the lowering of the 
present upper limit on pensions, a reduction in pension 
amounts for pensions taken before the age of 65, the 
introduction of the automatic linking of the statutory pen-
sion age to life expectancy (with effect from 2020) and 
the introduction of formulas to strengthen the connection 
between pension amounts and the contributions paid.
Spain
In Spain, the consolidation of public finances had already 
been started with the budget for 2010. This contained a 
number of discretionary measures, amongst other things 
a raising of VAT rates with effect from July 2010, higher 
excise duties and the winding down of a large number of 
temporary stimulus measures, such as a personal income 
tax credit. Furthermore, an extensive austerity plan for 
2011-2013 was announced in January 2010, but the 
measures had not yet been worked out in detail. At the 
time, the government also proposed a reform of pensions, 
which inter alia provides for raising the pension age from 
65 to 67. The cutbacks announced were speeded up and 
extended with a package of supplementary measures in 
May 2010 : the target for the budget deficit in 2010, fixed 
at 9.8 p.c. of GDP in the stability programme, was tight-
ened to 9.3 p.c. of GDP, and in 2011, the deficit needs to 
come down further to 6 p.c. of GDP, whereas the target 
in the stability programme was set at 7.5 p.c. of GDP. The 
measures in the supplementary package related solely to a 
reduction in government expenditure this time, of slightly 
over €  5 billion this year and €  10 billion in 2011. The 
most striking cutbacks comprise a lowering of the nomi-
nal pay of government officials of 5 p.c. on average with 
effect from mid 2010 and a freeze in 2011, a fall in public 
investment, a suspension of the index-linking of pensions 
in 2011 (with the exception of the lowest pensions), the 
phasing-out of the reduction in personal taxation in the 
case of childbirth or adoption and other savings within 
social security as well as cuts in the transfers to regional 
and local authorities. In the light of these decisions, the 
government deficit must come to 4.4 p.c. of GDP in 2012 
and 3 p.c. of GDP in 2013.
portugal
The Portuguese government also announced a new pack-
age of measures in May, with the intention of speeding 
up the consolidation of the budget. The budget for 
2010 already envisaged reducing the government deficit, 
amongst other things by way of a freeze on the pay of 54
civil servants. With the new plan, the budget deficit target 
is being tightened to 7.3 p.c. of GDP in 2010, compared 
with 8.3 p.c. in the stability programme, whilst 4.6 p.c. 
of GDP needs to be achieved in 2011, as against a target   
standing at 6.6 p.c. of GDP according to the stability 
programme. In contrast to the Spanish package of sup-
plementary savings, the new measures in Portugal relate 
mostly to the revenue side of the budget. The measures 
include raising VAT rates by 1 percentage point and rais-
ing personal and corporate taxation rates. Government 
expenditure is also being addressed, inter alia by way of 
a reduction in transfers to public enterprises and regional 
and local authorities, a reduction in government invest-
ment and a lowering of operating costs for central govern-
ment, amongst other things by way of a freeze in hiring.
italy
In Italy, in accordance with the stability programme, 
the government deficit needs to be reduced to 3.9 p.c. 
of GDP in 2011 and 2.7 p.c. of GDP in 2012, the year 
in which the excessive government deficit has to be 
brought to an end. To do this, supplementary measures 
were needed, on top of the cutbacks already planned 
in the three-year package for public finances extending 
from 2009 to 2011. At the end of May 2010, the Italian 
government announced a budgetary adjustment plan of 
around € 25 billion – that is 1.5 p.c. of GDP – which has to 
be implemented in 2011 and 2012. In principle, taxation 
is not being raised, but the fight against tax fraud is being 
stepped up. On the expenditure side, the most significant 
measures include a freeze on government officials’ pay, an 
extension of the freeze in recruitment and cuts in transfers 
to regional and local authorities.
ireland
Ireland, for its part, has already put several budget-
ary consolidation packages into effect since mid 2008 
and has thus succeeded in limiting the deterioration in 
public finances. The budget for 2010 contained a sig-
nificant package of measures, amounting to €  4 billion 
or 2.5 p.c. of GDP. It is primarily government expenditure 
that is being cut back, among other things by way of a 
cut in public sector wages, savings on social benefit pay-
ments and lower public investment. Furthermore, the sta-
bility programme provides for considerable consolidation 
measures in order to drive down the government deficit 
from 11.6 p.c. of GDP in 2010 to 2.9 p.c. of GDP in 2014.
france
France has taken significant steps in the course of 
2010 to restore its public finances. In accordance with 
the stability programme, the budget deficit has to be 
reduced considerably, to 6 p.c. of GDP in 2011, 4.6 p.c. 
of GDP in 2012 and 3 p.c. of GDP in 2013. At the 
end of January 2010, the French President convened 
a national conference on the government deficit, at 
which various working groups were tasked with formu-
lating proposals. At the beginning of May, a start was 
made on preparing the three-year budget for 2011-
2013. This needs to build on the three-year plan for 
government expenditure for 2009-2011, in which, as a 
basic rule, growth in central government expenditure is 
limited to inflation (zero growth by volume). The three-
year budget for 2011-2013 must continue to be based 
on controlling government expenditure. Expenditure 
by central government, with the exception of interest 
charges on the public debt and pension expenditure, 
is to be frozen in nominal terms until 2013. To this 
end, the policy of not replacing one out of every two 
government officials taking retirement must be contin-
ued. The current operating expenses of the Ministries 
have to shrink by 10 p.c. over three years, with a fall 
of 5 p.c. with effect from 2011. A comparable effort 
will be demanded from the public-sector operators 
(universities, museums, etc.). All so-called intervention 
expenditure – which comprises a set of grants and 
subsidies – will be re-examined. Although taxes are not 
being raised in principle, the exemptions, allowances 
and reductions in the area of taxes and social contribu-
tions will be reduced. In May, the President convened 
the national conference on the government deficit for 
the second time this year. It was decided that, so as to 
be able to realise the objectives arising from the stability 
programme, the pace of growth in expenditure must 
be slowed down with effect from 2011 in the three 
government sectors, namely central government, local 
government and social security. As far as expenditure 
by central government is concerned, reference is made 
to the proposals in the framework note for the three-
year plan for 2011-2013. The expenditure of local 
government must be brought under control and the 
financial transfers from central government to these 
governments will be frozen in nominal terms with effect 
from the planning period 2011-2013. For expenditure 
with regard to health care, the nominal growth target 
is being gradually slowed down further from 3 p.c. in 
2010 to 2.9 p.c. in 2011 and 2.8 p.c. in 2012. The 
President has also called for a reform of pensions and 
a revision of the constitution, whereby a compulsory 
path for the structural public balance would be imposed 
on every government for its term of office as well as a 
date for reaching a balanced budget. In mid 2010, the 
government also proposed a reform of pensions as a 
result of which, amongst other things, the legal pension 
age would be gradually raised from 60 to 62 in 2018.55
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germany
At the beginning of June 2010, the German government 
laid the foundations for converting the budget consolida-
tion planned with effect from 2011 into concrete meas-
ures. As mentioned above, Germany had already taken 
a significant step in mid 2009, which was unique in the 
European Union, so as to safeguard the sustainability of 
public finances over the long term, specifically by incor-
porating the ‘debt brake’ into its constitution. This new 
budgeting rule will apply from 2011 onwards and means 
that, with effect from 2016, the federal government’s 
structural deficit may no longer exceed 0.35 p.c. of GDP, 
whilst the budgets of the Länder must be in structural bal-
ance with effect from 2020. A stability council on which 
the federal government and the Länder are represented 
will monitor the public finances in order to identify and 
correct potential departures from the set course at an 
early stage.
The budget operation proposed by the government at 
the beginning of June 2010 embraces a financial plan 
with an impact increasing from €  11 billion in 2011 
to € 28 billion, some 1 p.c. of GDP, in 2014. It should 
enable the objectives of the stability programme and the 
obligation in the constitution to be respected. According 
to the stability programme, the government deficit has 
to be reduced to 4.5 p.c. of GDP in 2011, 3.5 p.c. of 
GDP in 2012 and 3 p.c. of GDP in 2013. In the measures 
proposed, investment in education and research is being 
expressly spared and the extra resources that had been 
set aside for it remain in place. Income tax and VAT are 
not being raised. What is being introduced is a tax on 
electricity generators, which are allowed to keep their 
nuclear power stations in operation longer  ; and finan-
cial transactions are to be subject to a levy with effect 
from 2012 which, however, is to be implemented in the 
wider European context. Furthermore, certain energy tax 
advantages are being limited and an air traffic charge 
is included for passengers departing from German air-
ports. However, the most significant cutbacks have to 
be realised on the government expenditure side, such 
as on social expenditure. Thus, amongst other things, 
support to the long-term unemployed is being reduced. 
The Federal Labour Agency will allocate unemployment 
benefit payments in a more targeted manner so that their 
automatic nature disappears. The parent’s benefit is being 
reduced for certain income categories and scrapped for 
the long-term unemployed. Furthermore, additional cut-
backs have to be made in public administration  ; thus, 
the number of federal officials has to be permanently 
reduced by more than 10,000 by 2014. An examination 
must also be carried out as to how the armed forces can 
be reduced by 40,000 troops.
the netherlands
Like Germany, the Netherlands paved the way at any early 
point to start restoring public finances to health. Thus, the 
supplementary policy agreement of March 2009, which 
still included a considerable extra package of measures 
so as to stimulate the economy and prevent the con-
sequences of the crisis spreading, already incorporated 
an engagement about restoring sound public finances 
and their sustainability over the long term. It was agreed 
that, in the event of a sufficient economic recovery in 
2011, a start would be made on consolidating public 
finances. This agreement also formulated a proposal to 
raise the age for the basic pension (AOW) from 65 to 67. 
In September 2009, the so-called “Fundamental Budget 
Review” (brede heroverwegingen) was announced on the 
occasion of the presentation of the budget for 2010, the 
intention being, in the light of the considerable deteriora-
tion in public finances, to prepare fundamental choices 
with regard to community services. The reports on the 
Fundamental Budget Review were submitted to the lower 
house of the Dutch parliament on 1 April 2010. They 
itemise policy variants of cutback measures for 20 areas 
of policy, where at least one variant in each case leads to 
a cost saving of 20 p.c. Whereas the stability programme 
for the Netherlands expects a government deficit of 
4.5 p.c. of GDP for 2012, the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis establishes in the medium-term 
outlook dated March 2010 that, in the light of the ageing 
of the population in the Netherlands, a budgetary surplus 
of 1.5 p.c. of GDP is required in 2015 so as to make public 
finances sustainable. To do this, a structural improvement 
is needed in the budget balance amounting to a total of 
approximately 5 p.c. of GDP. The Fundamental Budget 
Review can be used by the new government as a basis for 
making substantiated choices.
united kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the new government announced 
a five-year plan at the end of June 2010 with the purpose 
of strongly stepping up the efforts to consolidate public 
finances. The intention is to bring down the government 
deficit – which is estimated at 12 p.c. of GDP in 2010 by 
the EC, and which is projected to fall to 4.6 p.c. of GDP 
in the fiscal year 2014-2015 in accordance with the con-
vergence programme submitted in January 2010 – at a 
faster pace to 1.2 p.c. of GDP in 2015-2016  (1). To do this, 
the recovery plan provides for supplementary measures 
(1) The objective of 1.2 p.c. of GDP relates to the so-called “Treaty deficit”. 
With regard to the “public sector net borrowing” concept of the budget used 
by the British authorities, the intention is to limit the deficit to 1.1 p.c. of GDP 
in 2015-2016.56
that gradually increase from £ 8 billion – about 0.6 p.c. 
of GDP – in the fiscal year 2010-2011 to £  40 billion 
in 2014-2015. The emphasis is primarily on cutbacks in 
expenditure, the importance of which increases to around 
80 p.c. of the measures. These involve, amongst other 
things, steadily growing savings in social welfare benefits, 
to £ 11 billion in 2014-2015, and the freezing of public 
sector pay for two years, except for those earning the 
least. The raising of taxes includes, amongst other things, 
raising the standard rate of VAT from 17.5 p.c. to 20 p.c. 
with effect from January 2011, raising the tax on capital 
gains for tax-payers in the highest brackets and a levy 
based on banks’ balance sheets with effect from January 
2011. At the same time, a number of measures are being 
taken in support of the economy, for instance a gradual 
reduction in company taxation from 28 p.c. to 24 p.c. 
over four years with effect from April 2011 and the raising 
of personal income tax allowances.
belgium
Belgium recorded a deficit of 6 p.c. of GDP in 2009, 
which is less unfavourable than the European average. 
According to the last update to its stability programme, 
Belgium is committing itself to the rapid delivery of an 
effort to return to the threshold of 3 p.c. as early as 2012. 
On the one hand, this programme provides for raising 
revenues by 2.1 percentage points of GDP between 2009 
and 2012, without higher taxes on employment, with 
the exception of the abolition of the tax reduction in the 
Flemish Region (jobkorting). On the other hand, expendi-
ture is set to be driven down by 0.9 percentage points of 
GDP between 2009 and 2012, primarily in the year 2012. 
With regard to the years after that, Belgium is committing 
itself in this programme to post a balanced budget again 
in 2015, by reducing its deficit by one percentage point of 
GDP per year between 2012 and 2015.
If policy remains unchanged, the Federal Planning Bureau 
anticipates that the government deficit would stabilise at 
about 5 p.c. of GDP. To honour its obligations, Belgium 
must thus still take significant measures in the context of 
the budgets for the following years.
Conclusions
In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, 
budget deficits in most of the advanced economies have 
risen sharply, with the result that their public debt has 
increased rapidly. The current state of public finances 
in these countries can be regarded as a cause for   
concern.
To restore the sustainability of public finances, extensive 
restructuring efforts are therefore required in a wide 
range of countries. Although a rapid and significant con-
solidation effort implemented simultaneously by a large 
group of countries could act as a brake on the economic 
recovery to some extent, a postponement of consolidation 
efforts, on the other hand, could shake the confidence of 
economic agents, give rise to financing risks and trigger a 
sharp rise in interest rates. The problems that Greece had 
to contend with are a pertinent illustration of this.
To remove doubts about the creditworthiness of coun-
tries, it is therefore advisable not to delay the announce-
ment of concrete and credible consolidation plans, even 
if the measures will only be implemented in the years to 
come. The timing and scope of consolidation efforts are 
dependent on country-specific circumstances. Countries 
that are confronted with high or rapidly rising interest 
rates and possibly also financing risks naturally need to 
put the consolidation measures into effect immediately, 
whilst the adjustment can proceed more gradually in 
other countries.
The scope of the consolidation efforts needed in most 
countries means that no limitations can be imposed 
with regard to the composition of consolidation plans. 
However, preference needs to be given to structural meas-
ures that reduce non-growth-promoting government 
expenditure or can dampen the increase in ageing-related 
expenditure. In spite of the already heavy burden of 
compulsory taxation in many countries, extra government 
revenues cannot be ruled out.
Most countries have now begun preparing budgetary 
exit strategies. In this regard, budgetary objectives that 
will herald a return to healthy public finances have been 
announced. In some countries, concrete consolidation 
measures have already been worked out in the meantime. 
After Greece had to contend with problems financing its 
public debt, it has agreed to an extensive consolidation 
package in the context of emergency financing by the 
other countries in the euro area and the IMF. In the sub-
sequent period, many countries have elaborated concrete 
consolidation plans. In other countries, on the other hand, 
plans of this type have yet to be detailed. However, firm 
government action is urgently required for this latter group 
of countries too, all the more so since postponing the 
necessary consolidation efforts would entail major risks.57
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